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ALASKA CASE LAW
in Alaska and its total sales for Alaska delivery never exceeded 0.12%
of its total annual gross sales volume. The opinion covered the instant
facts with particularity, and discussed in detail the International Skoe,
McGee, and Hanson decisions (as well as Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) and Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1§61)). The
court's decision seems to turn on-the doctrine of "estimate of the incon-
veniences," as the court found that "it would be far more convenient
for Duriron to defend the suits in Alaska than to defend in Ohio and
transport all of the witnesses to that state from Alaska," 401 P.2d at
430. If the location of the witnesses is to be the controlling factor in
determining the extent of jurisdiction of the Alaska courts, rarely will
Alaska courts lack jurisdiction hereafter.
TORTS
Municipal Liability--Natural Causes"-Climatic Conditions and
Vehicular Traffic. A municipality is generally not liable for injuries
which result from the "natural causes" of snow and ice on city side-
walks.' Three recent Alaska decisions held that pedestrian and vehicu-
lar traffic which caused rough surfaces on sidewalks and crosswalks
were also "natural causes."
In Hale v. City of Anckorage,2 plaintiff was injured when she slipped
on a rough surface of snow and ice on a sidewalk curb-cut. The rough-
ness of the sidewalk had been caused by pedestrian and automobile
traffic during periods of alternate thawing and freezing. In Morrison v.
City of Anchorage,3 plaintiff was injured while attempting to avoid a
slush-filled gutter as she stepped from an icy sidewalk. In Gunsolus v.
City of Fairbanks,' plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on an
icy manhole cover at a street intersection crosswalk. In all three cases
plaintiff sued a city for failing to remove snow and ice. Held: Pedes-
trian and vehicular travel which causes rough surfaces on sidewalks and
crosswalks, and rising temperatures which cause slushy gutters, are
"natural causes," and, unless an obstruction results, a city is not liable
for resulting injuries.
In Gilfilen v. City of Seward5 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
119 McQumm, MUxiCiPAL CoIroRATIoNs § 54.84 n. 36, 37 (3d ed. 1950).
2 389 P2d 434 (Alaska 1964).
3 390 P2d 782 (Alaska 1964).
4 391 P2d 13 (Alaska 1964).
5 262 F.2d 864 (9th Cr. 1959).
1965]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Circuit reversed a determination by the Alaska territorial district court
that an accumulation of ice and snow on a sidewalk was, as a matter of
law, a "natural accumulation." The court stated,
The weight of authority... is that if snow and ice are permitted to
accumulate on a walk until, either by the passing of pedestrians over it,
or otherwise, the surface has become so rough or uneven that it is difficult
or dangerous for persons to pass over it, then the city may be liable to
pedestrians injured by slipping thereon.6
In Hale, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected this rule as unrealistic,
because of Alaska's unusually extreme weather conditions.' The court
concluded that pedestrian and vehicular traffic should be classed as
inatural causes."' This conclusion was approved and extended in Mor-
rison v. City of Anchorage, when the court by implication included ris-
ing temperatures as a "natural cause."' In Gunsolus, an approved jury
instruction listed useful guidelines for determining the scope of an
Alaskan city's duty. The jury was instructed to consider,
The cause and nature of the condition, the practical problem presented,
and in general, the necessities and size of the effort; and in this regard...
the amount of snowfall in the period preceding plaintiff's fall, the tem-
perature at that time, the equipment of the City used for snow removal
and ice control, the number of employees, the time devoted to snow and
ice control, the amount of streets requiring this work and the size of the
City in area and population.' 0
In general, the "natural causes" doctrine excepts municipalities from
responsibility for injuries resulting from "mere slipperiness" of streets
and sidewalks due to the presence of ice and snow." In Hale, the court
intimated that pedestrian traffic is as unpreventable as the presence of
ice and snow. The Alaska court's decision to include pedestrian and
vehicular traffic as "natural causes" was undoubtedly influenced by
the harshness of local weather conditions. 2 Alternate freezing and
thawing during winter months confront northern cities with the impos-
6 Id. at 866.
7389 P2d at 437.
8 Id. at 437-38. 19 McQuImN, MuxcpAL CoaRoRarloxs §§ 54.79, 54.85 (3d ed.
1950). For an extensive review of cases dealing with a municipality's sidewalk liability,
see Pearson v. Boise City, 80 Idaho 494, 333 P2d 998, 999 (1959).
0 390 P.2d at 782.
10 391 P2d at 14.
"119 McQulLLIN, MuNicrPAL CompoRAnIoNs § 54.84 (3d ed. 1950).
12 389 P.2d at 437.
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sible task of clearing all sidewalks before pedestrian and vehicular
traffic cause ice to form into rough and irregular ridges.' 8
Although the court in Morrison emphasized a point not clearly
established in Hale, that an Alaska city has no duty to remove or
remedy extremely rough icy surfaces, in neither case were the sidewalk
conditions classed as "obstructions to pedestrian travel." Judging from
results in other jurisdictions, the Alaska court may hold a municipality
liable for ignoring such "obstructions to pedestrian travel" as five-inch
high ridges of ice on city sidewalks" or structural defects in the sidewalk
aggravated by recent snowfall. 5
Few courts have outlined criteria for determining the extent of a
municipality's duty as carefully as did the approved jury instruction in
Gunsolus. Alamosa v. Jotnson'6 illustrates a restrictive view which
still prevails in some jurisdictions. In that case, the Colorado court
admitted evidence relating to locality, climate, weather conditions, and
other circumstances, but excluded evidence relating to equipment avail-
able for snow removal and the city's appropriation for clearing side-
walks. 7 It is obviously inconsistent to exclude evidence relating to a
city's equipment and funds for snow removal while admitting evidence
on weather conditions and local climate. The important consideration
is reasonableness of the responsibility imposed upon a municipality,
and all evidence bearing on reasonableness should be admitted.
'
3 Speakmzan v. Dodge City, 137 Kan. 823, 22 P.2d 485 (1933) ; Scoville 'v. Salt Lake
City, 11 Utah 60, 39 Pac. 481 (1895) ; Kling v. City of Buffalo, 72 Hun. 541, 25 N.Y
Supp. 445 (Sup. Ct 1893); Wright v. City of St. Cloud, 54 Minn. 94, 55 N.W 819
(1893).
'4 Canfield v. City of Philadelphia, 134 Pa. Super. 590, 4 A.2d 605 (1939).
25 Perri v. City of Neiv Haven, 133 Conn. 291, 50 A.2d 421 (1945). In Gunsoluq, the
Alaska court apparently overlooked any distinction between a city's sidewalk and cross-
walk responsibility, although decisions in other jurisdictions have generally imposed
greater responsibility on cities to keep sidewalks cleared. 19 McQuuhsN, MuNicnM.L
COaORATiONS § 54.89 (3d ed. 1950).
10 99 Colo. 134, 60 P2d 1087 (1936).
'7 Id. at 1088.
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